goals, including the mass killing of those who would actually or potentially disagree with that program. Restrictions on individual freedom in the interests of the collectivity and the willingness to kill massively are central to this definition; note also the importance of the state.
First, I will present the model of ephemeral ascendancies that has been used to explain the origins of political extremism across a wide variety of cases (Midlarsky, n.d.) .
Second, the Indian historical record is reviewed suggesting the nonconformity of the Indian Muslim population to that model. I also include the potential influence of Indian Muslim thinkers. They are important, for in the relative absence of extremist violence, we need to also understand ideational sources of that absence. Concrete instances of communal cooperation between Hindus and Muslims are given, based in part on principles suggested by these thinkers. Next, I turn to the historical trajectory of Sri Lanka, emphasizing the Jaffna Tamil community that has given rise to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an extremist group liberally utilizing suicide terrorism.
Reinforcing ephemera are found that indicate the theory's applicability. Finally, the danger to regional, even international stability in the form of military intervention is suggested by these ephemera, especially if they are reinforcing.
An ephemeral ascendancy occurs when a severe loss (territory, population, livelihood), typically perceived as a catastrophe, is preceded by a period of societal gain, which in turn is preceded by a period of subservience. Ephemeral ascendancies are reinforced when they occur in successive time periods.
Surprise, Vividness, and a Diachronic Model
Emotional reactions to a sudden loss or the threat of imminent loss can yield extremist consequences. As shown in Figure 1 , the diachronic model is based on a loss (often territorial and almost always surprising) that is preceded by a gain, which followed a still earlier period of subservience. Territorially-based authority spaces are frequently encountered as in the distance from a central (capital) city that its authority extends.
However, other forms of authority also exist, especially in colonial contexts that do not allow indigenously organized territorially based authority.
A stark contrast and surprise at the sudden change in fortune is important because of a consequence in the form of vividness. Both emotional pain and satisfaction can be multiplied substantially by the experience of surprise (Elster 2004: 160) . Or, as Loewenstein and Lerner (2003: 624) suggest, "people respond with greater emotional intensity to outcomes that are surprising -that is, unexpected." The emotional intensity associated with surprise therefore can lead to vivid information -that which is most likely to be acted upon rapidly (Mele 2003: 165) . Because of the emotional intensity and consequent vividness, a sense of urgency is imparted, or as Nico Frijda (1986: 206) puts it, "Urgency is the irreflexive counterpart of felt emotional intensity." Urgency is demanded without the contemplation and introspection associated with reflexivity (Frijda 1986: 186-87) . Anger can also independently lead to a sense of urgency (Elster 2004: 154) .
In the case of a previous loss prior to the existing one, an individual can explain the current circumstance by referring to the earlier one: perhaps a syndrome of loss stemming from episodic battles against overwhelming odds. Effectively, nothing different had really happened in the second instance that requires explanation. But in the case of an earlier gain prior to the current loss, especially if substantial, then the present loss becomes puzzling, even frightening and then angering, for there must be a special reason for its occurrence. Urgent action is then required against the putative offender to redress the loss, or at least to act quickly to prevent further loss. Figure 1 maps the changes in authority space, both increase and decrease, over time. Authority space is understood as the proportion of society over which governmental influence legitimately extends. Most spectacular were the contractions of authority space occurring after World War I when the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated and Imperial Germany was truncated. But important varieties of authority space exist in which societal groups have "captured" a particular governmental authority space, and based on long custom, expect to continue occupying an authoritative position within a governmental sector. As we shall see, the traditional increased Tamil dominance of the Ceylonese British civil service is a case in point, and its loss constituted a major contraction of that authority space.
Equally telling in its ultimate impact is the period prior to the increase in authority space. This period is not frequently considered, but is nevertheless important.
If the period before the increase consists of a long decline or remains at a consistently small or nonexistent national authority space, then reversion to that condition may be a major fear. The subsequent ascendant portion of the trajectory can then be seen to be an exceptional blip in national history, if in turn, followed by the downturn. Note that the figure here is not a smooth one, in order to signify that the increases or decreases in authority space take place abruptly at a war's end or independence of a colony, and not as the result of a continuous process of change. The dashed line represents a constant period of subservience that can have the same consequence as a steady decline. The figure does not show small changes in authority space that indeed can occur, but are dwarfed by the changes in authority space resulting from expansions or contractions of territorial domains, or changes in sovereignty.
Finally, an important buttressing of the diachronic model emerges from prospect theory. This theory tells us that losses are more highly valued than gains, or put another way, that the lost entity is psychologically more valued than an entirely identical entity that is gained (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 2000; Levy 2000) . Experimental evidence has consistently demonstrated the asymmetry between losses and gains, even to the extent that, in contrast to gains, losses can generate extreme responses. Losses as the result of a shrinking spatial environment, therefore, may have a magnified role in human consciousness, out of all proportion to their real-world consequences. When we add this asymmetry between gains and losses originating in prospect theory alone to the surprise, vividness, and emotional intensity stemming from the contrast between earlier gains and later losses, then these losses can be deeply consequential. Losses also are associated with risky behavior, often associated with extremist movements.
The Salience of Loss
Anger has been found to be associated with loss (Stein et al. 1993) . Equally important, anger has been shown to be a significant emotional response to injustice (Haidt 2003 Haidt (emphasis in original; 2003: 856) notes that "anger is not just a response to insults, in which case it would be just a guardian of self-esteem.
Anger is a response to unjustified insults, and anger can be triggered on behalf of one's friends, as well as oneself." Thus, anger is categorized by Haidt (2003: 853) as one of the "moral emotions", those "that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent."
People in a state of anger are "more apt to blame others for mishaps that occurred" (Berkowitz 2003: 816) . Further, persons of an ethnicity different from one's own are more likely to be targeted (Bodenhausen et al. 1994 , DeSteno et al. 2004 ).
Anger in response to loss also has been associated with the desire to obtain restitution or compensation (Stein et al. 1993) , or revenge (Frijda 1994, Nisbett and Cohen 1996) .
Following this normative theme, Frijda (1986) amplifies: Anger is provoked by a violation of what "ought to be" in the agent's view. Thus, a normative order has been violated, which justifies a challenge to this changing of the rules by the offending party.
That normative order could be based on religion in which, for example, Osama bin Laden and his followers perceive a gross violation of Islam in the presence of Christians and Jews in proximity to the holy sites of Mecca and Medina at the time of the 1991 Gulf War.
"Anger implies nonacceptance of the present event as necessary or inevitable; and it implies that the event is amenable to being changed" (Frijda 1986: 199) . Or as a consequence of loss, "anger often carries with it a desire not only to reinstate the goal, but also to remove or change the conditions that lead to goal blockage in the first place" (Stein et al. 1993: 291-4) . Thus, loss (or the threat of imminent loss) generates anger at the injustice of the loss, which in turn can be mobilized by extremist groups that seek not only to redress the loss (or counter the threat), but also can direct their anger at helpless civilian targets who are somehow implicated, often in the most indirect fashion, in the origins of the loss (Midlarsky 2005a, b) . Recent findings indicate that even routine partisan activity as in an American presidential election can generate emotional responses. When subjects were confronted with information that was inconsistent with their partisan leanings, M.R.I. scanners indicated that the "cold reason" regions of the cortex were relatively quiet. Instead, emotions guided their reactions (Westen et. al. 2006 ).
There is an additional element that suggests near universality for an authoritarian response to normative threat. Defining an authoritarian predisposition as a human characteristic akin to a personality trait, and an authoritarian response as an expression of the intolerance of difference, Karen Stenner (2005) finds that normative threats to the unity of a collectivity activates the authoritarian predisposition.
Among all of the variables she considered, authoritarianism was found to explain by far the largest percentage of the variance in intolerance of difference (Stenner 2005: 131) . More generally, she concludes that "much intolerance of different races, beliefs, and behaviors is driven…by a fundamental and overwhelming desire to establish and defend some collective order of oneness and sameness. In short, the entire defensive arsenal is fueled by the need to identify, glorify, privilege, and reward 'us,' and whatever beliefs and behaviors make us 'us,' and to differentiate, denigrate, disadvantage and punish 'them,' and whatever beliefs and behaviors make them 'them'" (emphasis in original; 2005: 277-278).
Fear can easily be generated by loss. Following Kim Witte (1992: 331) , fear is understood as "a negatively-valenced emotion, accompanied by a high level of arousal, and is elicited by a threat that is perceived to be significant and personally relevant."
When the loss and consequent fear entail a likely reversion to an earlier period of subservience, then they can be even more consequential.
India
Let us now examine the tendencies toward extremism, or lack of same, among the Certainly all is not well in the political and especially economic circumstances of Indian Muslims, but little or no evidence exists for ephemeral ascendancies in the recent past. The closest intimation of such a condition was found in the somewhat greater proportion of Muslims relative to Hindus in the early colonial Indian civil service. But after the great mutiny-rebellion of 1857 instigated in part by Muslim sepoys, quotas were established in the governmental service that began eliminating that disproportion (Robb 2002: 189) . By the turn of the twentieth century that disproportion had largely disappeared. Thus, little memory exists of this more than century-old small advantage over Hindus. Even more important, there were no later such advantages for Muslims that could call to mind that earlier condition.
Pre-Independence
The roots of the relative passivity of the Muslim community go deeper still and suggest two different paths for the Hindu and Muslim communities. (Kulke and Rothermund 2004: 208-14) . By 1740 and the death of Bājī Rāo, the last of the great Marāthā leaders, the kingdom had spread all over India. In 1785, the Marāthās even captured the Mughal capital, Delhi, which with a small territory surrounding it, was all that remained of the once extensive empire. Ultimately, the Marāthās also were too weak to successfully oppose British military force and finally succumbed in 1818, but only after two wars that taxed the limits of the British army in India.
This differential trajectory between Hindu and Muslim states is reflected in the second of our two paths, the formation of organized political action under the British Raj.
The Indian National Congress had its first meeting in December 1885 in Bombay, significantly a principal city of the old Marāthā lands (McLeod 2002: 76-99) . Also significant, perhaps much more so, was the predominance of Hindu delegates. While 54 of the delegates were Hindu, only 2 were Muslim, the remainder mainly Parsi and Jain.
In the Muslim view, Hindu dominance of the Congress movement would continue even after strenuous efforts of Hindus such as Ghandi to eliminate or at least attenuate that perception. Ghandi even adopted as his own the All-India Khilafat movement (Niemeijer 1972: 83-84; Minault 1982 One could leave it at that and assert that the absence of a principal antecedent of political extremism, an ephemeral ascendancy, explains the absence of that extremism.
But that would be too cavalier an approach, for we also need to understand why any sort of generalized extremism is not expected even among Islamist elements of the Indian population.
As a first cut, we must note a key difference between Indian Muslims that collectively do not govern a state, and others such as Arabs or Persians that do. (Habeck 2006: 151) . Once, as we have seen, the Caliphate or Khilafat movement was strong in India, but that was before establishment of an Islamic state in the region, Pakistan, and the independence of India.
With these emergent states, one of them explicitly Islamic, the Khilafat movement, already in decline, virtually disappeared. Removing "apostate" Muslim rulers in predominantly Islamic countries like Egypt or Saudi Arabia, is another goal of these Islamist movements, but again has little salience for the majority of India's Muslims.
Figure 2 depicts the contraction of authority space during the Mughal decline of the eighteenth century, and the subsequent relatively powerless condition of India's
Muslims during the period of the British Raj and contemporary India.
Indian Muslim Thinkers
What does concern the majority of India's Muslim thinkers and writers? As might be expected, the confrontation between tradition and modernity, is of major importance today, as it once was at the time of the 19 th century writings of Sayyed Ahmad Khan who attempted to reconcile Islam with the demands of contemporary life (Brown 2000: 94-5) .
He argued that Islam was compatible with reason and with "nature." Khan was very much an advocate of science and positivism. In 1877, he created a Westernizing Muslim
College at Aligarh, now the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) (Brown 2000: 95) .
A contemporary Indian public intellectual is Asghar 'Ali Engineer who interprets the Qur'an in liberal ways. He understands the Qur'an not to be a book of specific laws, but "above all, a call for a just social order based on a new value system, and the institutional forms that express these values can, and indeed must, radically differ across space and time" (Sikand 2004: 15 (Sikand 2004: 33) .
Nadwi also opposed the creation of Pakistan as a separate state for Muslims.
Only in a united India could Muslims continue their required missionary activity.
Although initially active in the Jama'at-i Islami founded by Maulana Sayyed Abul 'Ala Maududi, Nadwi became disillusioned both with its emphasis on the struggle to found an Islamic state and with the apparent "cult of personality" that grew up around Maududi.
"At Maududi's hands, he [Nadwi] says, 'God' (ilah), 'the Sustainer' (rabb), 'Religion'
(din) and 'Worship' (ibadat) have all been reduced to political concepts, suggesting that
Islam is simply about political power and that the relationship between God and human beings is only that between an All-Powerful King and His subjects. However, Nadwi says, this relationship is also one of 'love' and 'realization of the Truth', which is far more comprehensive than what Maududi envisages" (Sikand 2004: 36) . Instead of this preoccupation with politics, "love" and "the realization of Truth" are to be emphasized.
Only a "silent revolution" is conceivable in order to "prepare people's minds" for a genuinely Islamic government in the distant future.
After Indian independence, in contrast to most Islamists, Nadwi was willing to accept democracy and secularism in the face of potential Hindu extremism that could Clearly, these Indian Muslim thinkers establish a paradigm for majority-minority relations when Muslims are in the minority. The most important element here is the absence of a realistic expectation of state formation without some sort of cataclysmic outcome. Failing the "Armageddon" alternative, gradualism is required. Even if this program were to fail in its ultimate purpose of converting all non-Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, still the goal would continue to exist as a major preoccupation of the Muslim community. In the collective view of these thinkers, this alternative is vastly preferable to the mass political violence effectively advocated by radical Islamists.
Communal Violence and Cooperation
Although radical Islamism has not taken strong hold in the Indian subcontinent, with the possible exception of Kashmir, nevertheless, violence has occurred principally in the form of Hindu-Muslim communal rioting. This is not to say that this violence is trivial, Bangladesh. In the past, Indians have been targeted by this group [Farooq, 2007] . In the radical Islamist view, these attacks are justified where Muslims had formerly ruled, as did the Nizam of Hyderabad prior to independence [Stein 1998: 367] .) Instead, even when communal violence has been on the upswing as Ahutosh Varshney (2002: 95-102) chronicles in great detail, it is generally not the result of extremist tendencies but of intercommunal relations, often of a routinized political nature.
The state is crucial, not so much in daily practice, but in the imagination of the (Niemeijer 1972: 178) , but having established one such state, it was extremely unlikely that another could be founded.
More important is the not uncommon perception of Muslim neighborhoods in
India as mini-Pakistans. According to Rowena Robinson (2005: 13) , "In the north Indian plains, it is common to hear a man going to the toilet-that impure sandas often outside or behind the home-refer to his visit as 'going to Pakistan'. In the brutal communal discourses we have been made to countenance, more so over the last decades, the Indian Another limitation on Muslim neighborhoods is the heightened police presence after each riot. Thus, the area of habitation is increasingly circumscribed, and the police further limit the movement of Muslims. Given this processual loss of territory, one might expect an extremist response. However, in the absence of an ephemeral ascendancy in the recent past and even a remote expectation of state formation for Indian Muslims, the only option is fortitude (e.g., Nadwi, see above) or the occasional act of revenge (e.g., the
Gujarat train fire killing some fifty Hindus) that yields many more Muslim deaths after the subsequent more intense communal violence. "Given the minority position and the geographical dispersion of Muslims, 'devotion for political ends' has, right from the outset, very little potential of fulfillment regardless of the ambitions of individual persons or particular sub-groups" (Robinson, 2005: 156) . How did this extremist, terrorist organization evolve to the point of governing a portion of Sri Lanka under these conditions? In particular, the resort to suicide bombing by the LTTE with its potential for mass murder requires explanation. The theory of ephemeral ascendancies, especially the fear of merely a transitory governance will go far to explain this extremist behavior. To do this effectively, the political histories of the two communities need to be addressed even in pre-colonial times. As we shall see, a political substitutability (Most and Starr 1989) during the colonial period will be encountered that will do much to set the stage for Sinhalese nationalism and Tamil extremism.
Pre-Independence
The history of the earliest periods prior to the arrival of the Europeans is murky, but certain basic facts are known. During this time, there were indigenous Sinhalese and Tamil Kingdoms vying for control of the island. This process settled into a Tamilgoverned kingdom in Jaffna in the northern portion, and one governed by the Sinhalese in the southern sector, and especially the interior of the island. But the Portuguese arrived in 1505 and displaced Muslim merchants who had earlier dominated regional trade.
Through a process of gradual expansion, the Portuguese began to dominate the northern region and expanded beyond it. By 1519, the Jaffna kingdom, although still independent was substantially reduced in strength. In 1591, after a Portuguese invasion of the Jaffna peninsula, a local puppet monarch was installed under their tutelage. After a revolt of Christian subjects and an attempted suppression of that rebellion by the Tamil authorities, in 1619 the Portuguese annexed the kingdom outright (Peebles 2006: 36) . This kingdom now lost its independence, never to be revived until some facsimile of that earlier condition was restored after 2000.
After 1621, the only surviving indigenous polity was that of Kandy, situated in the interior. Earlier, in 1581, upon an invasion by a neighboring indigenous opponent, the kingdom lost its sovereignty for a decade. After independence was reestablished, the This time was the first since the early and mid-fifteenth century, when a Sri Lankan (Sinhalese) ruler had effective control over the whole island for about fifty years, that the process of unification had been successfully introduced."
A reorganization of the island colony in 1832 that effectively ended a Buddhist religious hegemony, also allowed Christian missionary activity. American missionaries were to be critical in this effort and, "The best schools in the island-some say the best schools in Asia-were in the Jaffna peninsula. American missionaries supported education as means to convert students; the people of Jaffna responded enthusiastically to the opportunity. Jaffna Tamils used education to move into the English-speaking occupations in government, the private sector, and the professions. Many Tamils migrated to the southern and central regions for employment, leading to Sinhalese protests and the British favored Tamils over the majority Sinhalese" (Peebles 2006: 63) .
Hereafter, English-language education was controlled largely by Christian missionaries.
"The gap in prestige and income between the English-educated and the swabashaeducated was immense" (Peebles 2006, 63) , and "The biggest beneficiaries of British colonialism were those who speak English" (Peebles 2006: 65) .
In addition to the Dutch Burghers, left over from the colonial period, missionaryeducated Jaffna Tamils were to constitute an administrative elite. An additional consequence was the study of Jaffna history and culture by English-speaking Tamils; the sense of a unique Jaffna Tamil identity was enhanced. Although as of 1938, Indian civil servants comprised 25% of all government workers in Ceylon (as the colony was called under the British), by 1941, they were reduced by more than half. Correspondingly there was a net emigration of some 65,000 people of Indian origin to India. Increasingly, the English-speaking Jaffna Tamils assumed many of these vacated positions so that by 19) of this Sri Lankan population that was Jaffna Tamil. Not having been granted citizenship, the Indian (so called "Plantation") Tamils comprising 5.51% of the population were not eligible for these positions.
Patrick Peebles, probably calculating on a different database, indicates that 30% of the jobs in the "administrative services" at that time were occupied by Jaffna Tamils;
"by 1975, that number had fallen to 5%" (2006: 113), a substantial reduction, whatever the initial estimate.
Here we see the trajectory of an initial Jaffna Tamil subservience to colonial powers after 1619 (two centuries before the demise of the Sinhalese Kandyan state),
followed by a growing ascendancy of Jaffna Tamils within the colonial civil service during the 19 th and 20 th centuries. Effectively, a substitution of civil service authoritythe only kind allowed indigenous peoples within a colonial setting -for political power in an independent state had been achieved by the Jaffna Tamils. Confronted with the widespread English proficiency of the Jaffna Tamils, most Sinhalese could not aspire to that status. But after 1956, when this authority was removed from the Tamils by the Sinhalese only Language Bill, the descent was rapid. As we shall see, economic dominance by Tamils in major cities like Colombo and Trincomalee also would prove to be transitory.
Rise of the LTTE
Initially, inter-communal conflict was the protest norm. The Sinhalese character "Sri" was defaced on license plates; in response Tamil language signs were painted over.
But soon in 1958, violence took the form of "rape, beating, arson, and murder directed at Tamils, but Tamils soon retaliated against Sinhalese" (Peebles 2006: 111 Along with the "nationalization" of language in favor of Sinhala, many Tamilowned industries were nationalized. For example, shipping companies owned by Tamils were displaced in 1967 when the port of Trincomalee in the eastern sector was nationalized (Peebles 2006: 116) . At around this time, the communal pressure for an independent Tamil state began to grow. Additionally only militarized pressure was deemed to have any chance of success.
In part to palliate Sinhalese nationalists who were dissatisfied with the ( Sporadic anti-Tamil riots followed the library fire, many sparked by government agents.
Inescapably, many if not most Tamils came to the conclusion that in the name of Sinhala August 1985 nearly 100 Tamils were murdered after an army patrol narrowly escaped a land mine explosion (Bush 2003: 139) . Simultaneously, the SLA began a campaign of air raids and artillery shelling of the Jaffna peninsula. An LTTE response in April 1987 was to stop vehicles on the ColomboTrincomalee Road and massacre over a 100 Sinhalese passengers. Shortly thereafter, the Colombo bus station was bombed, killing between 100-200 people and injuring hundreds more (Bush 2003: 141) . The SLA campaign continued with military thrusts into the region. And on July 5, with its power over Jaffna increasingly in jeopardy, the LTTE carried out its first suicide bombing in which forty SLA troops were killed in the Nelliyadi army camp. Figure 3 illustrates this historical trajectory. 
Indian Intervention
Given the large Tamil population in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu across the Palk Strait from the Jaffna peninsula, it might seem inevitable that India eventually would intervene in the Sri Lankan violence. Actually, it was the Indian external intelligence agency, the Training camps were set up in Tamil Nadu, but as hostility to the LTTE increased in India, the Tigers began moving their bases to the Jaffna peninsula. In the midst of the SLA offensive (begun in February 1987) against the LTTE in Jaffna, the Indian air force began dropping food and medicine to the rebels, after a refusal by the Sri Lankan government to allow such shipments by sea. In July, an agreement to allow Indian forces to enter Sri Lanka essentially was imposed upon the Sri Lankan government; soon 6,000
Indian troops of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) were in the Jaffna region (Peebles 2006: 157) . Almost immediately, the IPKF and LTTE came into conflict as the former tried to disarm the Tamil rebels, and the violence quickly escalated.
By the time the IPKF withdrew from Sri Lanka in 1990, it had lost 1,157 troops in combat and nearly 3,000 wounded in India's longest war (DeVotta 2004: 173) . Clearly, the initial decision to arm the Jaffna Tamil rebels had become a "blowback" for the Indian government, as had the CIA's strategy to arm Islamic militants in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan during the mid-1980s. The role of suicide bombing in the Indian decision to ultimately withdraw all support from the LTTE should not be minimized, for in March 1991 Rajiv Ghandi was assassinated by an LTTE female suicide bomber.
The first suicide bombing by the LTTE occurred just prior to the Indian intervention; LTTE suicide bombing would also put an exclamation point to the end of that action. And the reinforcing ephemera experienced by the Jaffta Tamils would set the stage for that unfortunate intervention. Nothing of that sort has happened internal to India (again excluding Kashmir); violence at this level involving government forces has been avoided. Religion has not been a major factor in Sri Lanka's violence, as in India religion has not inspired suicide terrorism or other manifestations of extremist behavior beyond communal acts of revenge.
Conclusion
Why are ephemeral ascendancies, especially reinforcing ephemera so dangerous for international stability, at least at the regional level, even beyond? Anger associated with these ephemera is intense. As a consequence, the violence that erupts tends to be severe and long lasting in the absence of the massive external force needed to quell the violence. If the ephemera are reinforced as in the Sri Lankan case, then the intensity of the ethnic conflict is increased to the point that external intervention becomes more likely. The histories, literature, folktales, and legends of the earlier ephemeral ascendancies of the past are drawn upon by both politicians and citizens, intensifying the feelings of loss and anger. Another classic instance of this phenomenon is the Serbian aggression after 1991 resulting from three reinforcing ephemera that yielded massive conflict within the former Yugoslavia including genocide at Srebrenica, the only case of this kind in Europe after 1945 (Midlarsky n.d.) . Western, especially American intervention was required to end the violence. Alas, the size of the Indian force needed to decisively defeat the LTTE, and the political will to continue the IPKF mission in Sri Lanka were absent, and so the violence continues to this day.
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